The Crisis in Context; Hizballah versus Druze and Sunnis, with Christians on the Sidelines
The current crisis in Lebanon, currently five days old, has shown the power of Hizballah in the country - and vicariously, that of Iran and Syria. While today things have quieted down in Beirut itself, violence has flared in Tripoli, red lines have been crossed, Hizballah continues its confrontation, and the Sunnis in particular have been thrown into their greatest crisis since 1979. I would like to provide some context to the current crisis, explain why it was nearly inevitable, and discuss some key events of the past two days.
A Crisis in the Making
The current political alignment in Lebanon was set in late 2004 as former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri decided to run for prime minister on a Lebanese independence platform, opposing another term for Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, who is a puppet of Syria. Hariri was assassinated in early 2005, with the UN-sponsored Mehlis Report later publishing details of Syria's complicity in the murder at high levels. This led to an alignment of Sunnis, Christians and Druze against the Shia, represented by Hizballah and Amal, aligned with Syria and Iran. This configuration was modified somewhat when the Christian leader Imad Mishal Aoun broke with the "March 14 Forces" (so called because of a massive anti-Syrian protest on March 14, 2005) and sealed an alliance with Hizballah in exchange for its support - and thus impliedly, Syria's - for him becoming president. About a year and a half ago, the "Opposition" - as they are usually referred to in the Arab press - left the government and pulled out of parliament, throwing the government into a stalemate and preventing the parliament from achieving a quorum.
This stalemate came to a head in November 2007 when Lahoud's term came up, and the majority of Prime Minister Fuad Siniora was unable to elect a new president because of this lack of a quorum (assassinations reduced the majority to a handful of seats, and while the Lebanese constitution allows for an election by simple parliamentary majority after the first attempt, the opposition has blocked this). This has left the country with an institutional void, and in February reports began to appear in the Arab press that the sectarian groups were rearming themselves in case of a renewed civil war. Each month Siniora would call parliament to meet, and each time it would fail to achieve quorum.
The Arab League intervened with great fanfare in January with a compromise proposal by which the head of the army, Imad Michel Sulayman, would be elected president by consensus, along with a new agreement on cabinet appointments. The Syria-aligned parties blocked this, demanding simultaneous agreement on appointments in the military as well as the civilian government.
The threat of civil war became more clear when in March when Saudi Arabia ordered all its citizens out of the country. Later that month the annual Arab League meeting was held in Damascus, and about half the Arab countries - including Saudi Arabia and Egypt - boycotted in protest.
Crossing the Red Lines: Majority Exerts Sovereignty and Hizballah Seizes Beirut
I have been following this sequence of events continually through the Arab satellite channels and will supplement that with a long piece in al-Hayat published on Sunday which covered most of the events of the weekend, including Siniora's speech to the nation ("Most Violent Affrontments in the North, Tragic Event in the Capital Before 'Initiative' of Sulayman... Mualim Skips Arab League Meeting and Warns Against 'International Intervention'...Beruit in the Hands of the Army"). U.S. media coverage has also been better here than is usually the case in Iraq, so I've linked to news reports below.
This recent escalation got rolling early last week with Druze leader Walid Junblatt's press conference in which he revealed that Hizballah had maintained a parallel communications system in Beirut and that the senior officer in change of security at Rafiq Hariri International Airport - Colonel Wafiq Shaqir - was loyal to Hizballah. He called on the government to prevent Iranian flights into Lebanon. My understanding is that the existence of these things was known previously, but that the government had chosen not to confront the issue until now.
The government reacted with two decisions - to remove Shaqir from his post and close Hizballah's communications network in Beirut. Hizballah reacted with fury. Hizballah Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah gave a fiery address on Wednesday in which he vowed that Hizballah would not use the weapons of "resistance" against Lebanese, but that it would "cut off the hand" of any faction which acted against it. Immediately after the speech, Shia gunmen from both Hizballah and Amal effectively seized Beirut by fanning out from their stronghold in the southern suburbs, taking control of Sunni areas, shutting down the international airport and blocking roads into the city. They also attacked besieged the private compounds of Saad Hariri and Walid Junblatt, attacking a "Mustaqbal" (Future) television station and forcing it off the air by threatening employees elsewhere. (Mustaqbal is owned by Hariri; I watch it at times and knew it was down - by Sunday night it was down for four days.) Hizballah called for Siniora's resignation. The fact that the government's decision to face down Hizballah on this issue coincided with a labor strike against it for failure to agree to wage demands put the govenrment in an especially precarious position.
The Sunni mufti Shaikh Muhammad Rashid Qabbani responded with a statement broadcast across the Arab world - the Sunnis of Lebanon were under attack, and he called upon Arab countries to come to their aid. Arab commentators started using words like ghazwa ("attack," usually reserved for the U.S. invasion of Iraq) and ihtilal ("occupation," usually applied to Israel) to describe Hizballah's actions in Beruit. Hariri gave a televised speech from his compound - later seconded by Junblatt - calling for his followers to surrender their positions to the army rather than fight Hizballah, and entrusting the city to "the guardianship of the army."
On Saturday, Prime Minister Siniora spoke to the nation for the first time. He strongly condemned Hizballah, emphasizing the he had never called for the disarming of Hizballah by force and asking sarcastically, "have the Israeli settlements in Palestine been moved to Beruit?" He noted that the two decisions which set off the fight had not been implemented, and set forth three positions -
- that the two decisions be placed on hold and entrusted to the army,
- that the army immediately move to restore order, which meant that Hizballah would have to retreat from Sunni areas or face attack, and
- the election of Sulayman as president on the basis of consensus immediately.
Violence also spread over the weekend to the Druze area near Beruit, where there as a Druze-Shia fight, and to Tripoli in the north of the country, in which Sunnis attacked Allawis (the Syrian government is dominated by Allawis). Christians largely stayed out of direct confrontation, although Geagea joined Junblatt in supporting any decision made by Siniora and Hariri, while Hizballah-ally Aoun stayed silent at first and then came out with what appeared to me to be a very evasive press conference.
This leaves the Lebanese military holding the balance of power in the country. Many were disappointed with the army's failure to prevent Hizballah from seizing control of Sunni areas, attacking individuals and damaging property. While the army clearly wanted to maintain neutrality in order to avoid desertion by Shia soldiers, some warned that its failure to protect others posed the opposite problem. On Sunday Beirut was quieter while violence continued in the north. Since 1989 the Sunnis, Christians and Druze have relied on the army to protect them from Shia militants. All eyes will be on the military from this point onward to see if it can hold itself, and the country, together.
- Clashes in General Strike in Lebanon, New York Times
- Hizballah Seizes Swath of Beirut, New York Times
- Opposition Seizes Most of Beirut, Washington Post
- Lebanon Struggles to Defuse Crisis, Washington Post
Implications
In the short to medium term, this is a victory for Hizballah, Syria and Iran, albeit a limited one. Hizballah appears to have succeeded in preventing the government in this attempt to establish sovereign control over the country, and has shown itself to be the country's most powerful force, cast doubt on the reliability of the military, and thrown the Sunnis into a deep crisis of confidence. Yet it will take more to achieve Syria's goal of destroying the Siniora government. Hizballah scored a psychological victory without suffering material damage - in contrast to the 2006 war with Israel, which was a psychological victory with significant material loss - and that is what is most important for Iran. In that sense, Iran is more a winner here than Syria.
The long-term implications are less clear. Hizballah has crossed a red line in using its weapons of "resistance" against fellow Lebanese, and the fact that they did so within hours of Nasrallah saying they would never do so adds to the damage. I suspect that Aoun, Hizballah's Christian ally, has also been damaged. The Sunni attacks on the Allawis in the Tripoli area just underscore the breadth of the chasm between the factions. And that does not bode well for the future of Lebanon.
The past week has clearly demarcated the new balance of power in the country - away from the Christians, toward the Shia and with the Sunnis holding the balance. This was clear enough before, but is much more explicit now. The Sunnis themselves also face a crisis of confidence, having seen themselves helpless in the face of Shia aggression, with the military slow to respond. Saad Hariri was probably wise to avoid direct armed confrontation with Hizballah, but holed up in his compound it looked to some like a loss of nerve all the same. The shoes of his father are large indeed.
As for the Siniora government, there is every indication that it will hang on for the time being, and it enjoyes strong support from the rest of the Arab world. Hizballah is essentially a state within a state, and a sovereign state has the right to take the actions Siniora took. But the decision to force the issue at this time, with an institutional void and a general strike called by the labor unions on unrelated economic bases seems especially unwise. It will be hard to avoid an embasssing climb-down at this point.
