Orientalist Notebook

UPDATES, 06.22.2008

A Regular Feature Updating News on Topics from Recent Posts

Lebanon
Low-level violence continues in Lebanon as the majority and opposition continue to wrangle over cabinet posts. The struggle is over the so-called "power ministries" - defense, interior, finance and foreign affairs. Maronite opposition leader Imad Aoun wants one of them, and the majority isn't budging. They insist that the "consensus president" will appoint defense and interior, and the majority will have finance and foreign affairs. Hizbullah is a involved at the street level, but is not taking part in this power struggle, having already won their right to maintain their private army and veto over future actions by the government, whoever might be in it. This is a struggle between Hizbullah's allies - especially Aoun - and the Siniora-led majority. Siniora is now "prime minister-designate" with no cabinet. It appears - and I'm piecing this together from multiple Arab press reports, not really sure at this time - is that the only power ministry Aoun is being offered is foreign affairs, but he wants finance or one of the security portfolios and the majority is refusing this. What is clear is that President Sulayman will apoint defense and interior, the majority will hold to finance and communications, and Aoun is not happy at all.

Now there is talk of the "overthrow" of the Doha agreement, as violence between allies of the two sides increased in Tripoli over the weekend, an escalation which was accompanied by an increase in violence in the Ayn al-Hilwa Palestinian camp. In Tripoli, to be specific, it is a fight between allies of Hariri and the Alawis, who of course are the same identity group as that which rules Syria, Hariri's main enemy and Hizbullah's ally. Things are not getting better, they are getting worse. Doha is very close to being a dead letter.

Recent related posts -
- Lebanon and the Arab Alignment, May 27
- Beruit Burning, May 11

Iraq
Sadr has a new strategy, and the Washington Post ("Powerful Iraqi Cleric Recalibrates Strategy") has part of the story. What is missed here - and reported in the Arab media - is that Sadr isn't sitting out the provincial elections, he is simply seeding his supporters as independents through other lists, mainly those of Ibrahim Jaafari and (to a lesser extent) Iyad Allawi, to give them protection from Maliki's intent to ban them. I don't think, as the WaPo article seems to suggest, that they pulled out for fear of loss - Maliki was planning to ban them by law for having a militia. I expect that if provincial elections go forward in October, this will give Jaafari a big boost.

Otherwise, indications of this new tendency in the Iraqi government toward pushing back at Iran as well continue, as Oil Minister Hussein Shahristani, who lived in Iran for years during the Baathist period, has been criticizing Iran over its interference with full control of the Faka oil field, which is near the Iranian border. (source) The government has also moved its military operations to Amara, Maysan, a province in which the Mahdi Army has always been strong. Reports indicate that the Sadrists surrendered their office in the city of Amara without a fight, unlike elsewhere. These operations continue.

Recent related posts -
- Shia Fragmentation Continues, June 13
- Sistani Moves Against U.S. Agreement, June 1

SHIA POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION CONTINUES

Maliki, with Second Political Wind, Still Fails to Negotiate Majority; PM Faces Party Revolt, Fragmenting Base

Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Maliki, very nearly voted out of office in March, obtained a second political wind with his strong crackdown on the Sadrists and the Mahdi Army. Yet the restarting of negotiations with Iraq's largest Sunni bloc have broken down again, as he and the Accord Front have failed to agree to a list of new ministers. Maliki has also faced an internal revolt within his own Dawa Party, with a former prime minister taking over many of the party's office. Finally, as provincial elections voting lists are released, it doesn't appear that anyone wants to be associated with the governing United Iraqi Alliance (UIA).

Maliki-Accord: The Negotiation Saga Continues
As negotiations between the Maliki government and the Sunni Accord Front move into their tenth month, they seem to have broken down again. Now the major issue seems to be the Minister of Planning. Remember that when Accord left the government last September, their minister of planning refused to leave, and they kicked him out of the party. Now they want that ministry back, and they want the renegade sent packing, but the UIA says they won't jettison someone who supported the government. I'm still not convinced that they could get a majority in parliament to approve the list of five ministers once it is agreed upon. In addition to defections of independents, Accord appears also to be facing the defection of one of its three main factions (see below). Of its original 44, I doubt it can muster 30 now.

To give a few examples to show the tenor of these negotiations, looking through some of my sources, on May 5 Maliki rejected Accord's six-person list (five ministers and a deputy prime minister), saying, without apparent irony, that he wanted cabinet ministers with qualifications so as to have a "technocrat" government ("Iraqi Government Reservation About Names Submitted by Accord Front," al-Quds al-Arabi). On May 22, al-Hayat reported that negotiations with Accord continued and "are in their final stages and its return is near," something that has been reported probably appeared in 900 headlines since last fall. On May 27 the same source headlined "Accord Front Doubts Maliki's Sincerity in Bringing About Return of Ministers to Govt," and quoted them as saying that they were going to give Maliki two more weeks, or "one last try," something else I've read before. On May 29, the Emirate newspaper al-Ittihad reported on the issue that Maliki continued to block the planning candidate, and quoted an Accord representative as emphasizing that "getting back into the government is not an end unto itself for us, but to have real and effective participation..." That was of course the reason they left - they had ministries, but no real power in government. The May 29 report of al-Hayat included a quote from Tariq Hashemi expressing optimism that Accord would return "within days," confirming what I've noticed for months that while Hashemi's Islamic Party really wants back in the government, the other two factions of Accord less so. Then on May 11, the same source reported that, according to party leader Adnan Dulaimi, the government gave them "no official response" on their most recent proposal, and that "all that has been put forward about us agreeing to their recent proposal is just media statements."

Jaafari's Pustch
On April 5 former prime minister Ibrahim Jaafari led what may be described as a "soft coup" inside the Dawa Party against Prime Minister Maliki, who is nominally its head. According to Iraqi and international Arabic press reports, Jaafari took over Dawa's offices in Najaf and renamed them under the heading of his new faction, the "National Reform Faction." He also took over an unspecified number of party offices in other Shia areas, including the Kathimiya area in Baghdad. Although press reports largely reported that "Dawa Expels Jaafari," it is not clear whether Maliki has expelled Jaafari or Jaafari has expelled him, since the party's Najaf offices are its national headquarters, Jaafari's people have tried to downplay the split since. (The pro-Dawa Buratha News headlined the issue, "Islamic Dawa Party Expels Ibrahim Jaafari and Denies His Membership to Party," whereas al-Hayat headlined the issue more neutrally - "Division in the Dawa Party Leads to Supporters of Jaafari Declaring their Control over Najaf Offices.")

Jaafari's coalition, the National Reform Faction ("Faction" here may be alternatively translated as "Current" or "Tendency"), appears to include about ten current members of the Iraqi parliament, including some unspecified division from the 12 held by Dawa and the 27 UIA independents. There is a further division in Dawa with the Ansar Dawa, so Maliki's contingent in parliament is something well less than 12, making him more dependant than ever on Abd al-Aziz Hakim's Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. Furthermore, Jaafari's group is now aligning itself with a new parliamentary coalition that includes the Sadr faction, Fadhila, Iyad Allawi's Iraqi List, Salih Mutlaq's National Dialogue Front, some independents and the third Accord faction referred to above, Khalf Alyan's National Dialogue Council. I estimate that this new coalition will have around 100-110 seats in parliament, and it will be the parliament's largest, although it remains to be seen whether or not it can replace Maliki.

Provincial Elections
Iraqis have now registered for the provincial elections scheduled for October 1, although parliament has yet to pass the enabling law setting down the ground rules for the elections (i.e. how many districts or seats per province, etc.; see High Commission Expects Postponement of Provincial Elections to Later Time"), but the registration process itself has been illuminating. According to al-Watan ("Political Factions Participate Through Individual Lists in Provincial Elections"), 503 separate lists have registered, including 300 for Baghdad alone. That the Sunni factions would be fragmented, with tribal Awakening (Sahwa) groups running in separate lists against the Sunni political parties now in parliament, is not surprising. Tariq Hashemi's Iraqi Islamic Party in particular has been allowed to have disproportionate weight in national and provincial politics because they ran unopposed in 2005. The Awakening are now eager to run against them, with the contest more heated in Anbar than anywhere.

With the Shia it is a somewhat different matter. Only the followers of Muqtada Sadr boycotted in 2005, and all others are represented at the provincial and national level (the Sadrists are present at the national level, of course, but among the Sunnis the Awakening have no representation at either level). If the governing parties had performed well since that time, then we could expect for candidates to want to run on their lists this time. This is evidently not the case. No one is running under the list of the United Iraqi Alliance, and even Petroleum Minister Hussein Shahristani is running as an independent (the fact that he is running at all is somewhat disturbing, unless he plans to resign his national post). According to a June 13 article in al-Quds al-Arabi ("UIA Factions to Run in Provincial Elections on Individual Lists"), the Dawa Party - Organization of Iraq is also running independently, and in my mind they stopped supporting the government last fall. Of course, as noted above, some Shia candidates are running under Jaafari's group. This is especially a bad reflection on the Supreme Council, which currently controls seven of the nine provinces in the south.

SISTANI MOVES AGAINST U.S. AGREEMENT

Popular Opposition to Long-Term Security Agreement with U.S. Increases with Clerical Support; Sadr Moves to Exploit Fissure

Popular opposition to the long-term military agreement that the Iraqi government is currently negotiating with the United States has been clear for some time, as is the fact the Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and the Najaf hawza would be attempting to block it. On Friday, Muqtada Sadr moved to take advantage of the issue and his followers protested widely, and now the American media has taken notice (see "Growing Opposition to U.S. Security Pact," New York Times, "Sadr Urges Followers to Protest U.S.-Iraq Pact," and "Shiites Across Iraq Protest U.S. Presence,"Washington Post).

While I do not discount the value of having a military pact in place, a successfully negotiated treaty will not be worth much if it cannot be implemented. Part of the problem is a lack of clarity as to precisely what the terms would be (discussed to some degree in the articles linked above), and part is due to the paranoia-mongering which is common in these kinds of debates. Nevertheless, it is looking increasingly likely that any final agreement - whatever its terms - will have a very hard time being approved.

Opposition to the treaty first began to crystallize in January, when 150 members of parliament (275 seats) reached a voting agreement which, among other things, stipulated opposition to a long-term military agreement with the United States. The primary items on the voting agreement related to the Kurds - the Kurdish oil contracts issue and the potential annexation of Kirkuk - but Arabic media reports generally also included this item. Prior to this past week, there were also indirect indications that Sistani and the Iraqi marja'iya was opposed as well. For example, when Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Iraq at the beginning of March, he had intended to visit Najaf and meet with Sistani, but was turned back. According to the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Jarida al-Jadida, Sistani refused to meet with Ahmadinejad because he didn't want to give the impression that his opposition to the U.S. agreement was due to Iran (other sources simply said that Najaf didn't want Ahmadinejad around). Other sources claiming Sistani was opposed were similarly indirect.

Yet over the past week, prior to the Sadr-organized protest on Friday, it became clear that Sistani was now directly opposing the Iraqi government over the issue, a key fact largely overlooked in U.S. media coverage (the Post article referenced the issue by saying that "Aides to Iraq's most influential Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, have also expressed concerns," which is not really accurate - they are opposing it). The Arab newspaper al-Hayat as followed this closely. Last Thursday, May 29, al-Hayat reported that Sistani told Prime Minister Nuri Maliki during their most recent meeting that he should hold a popular referendum to approve the agreement
(Marja'iya Najaf Demands General Referendum on U.S.-Iraq Agreement). This was a blocking tactic; Sistani knows well that Maliki is unlikely to risk such a referendum, and public knowledge that he was refusing Sistani's demand for a referendum would firm up opposition within parliament (which, as noted above, was a majority anyway). Contrary to what is suggested by the headline of the second Post article linked above, this opposition is not necessarily to U.S. presence per se, but rather to the signing of a long-term security pact. (The Sadrists, of course, are opposed to any U.S. presence per se.)

Sistani's representative in Karbala, Ahmad Safi, used his Friday sermon to make Najaf's opposition to the pact more public and explicit ("Sistani Representative in Karbala: Marja'iya Against Agreement which Limits Future Generations," al-Hayat, May 31). The article noted that Sistani was not only opposed this agreement, but favored removing Iraq from Article 7 of the UN Charter, which limited its sovereignty. A separate article published the same day ("Hakim Confirms Negotiations with Washington have not Reached a Final Result and Hashemi Warns Against Crossing 'Red Lines'") quoted Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim and Tariq Hashemi, the country's most important Shia and Sunni politicians, respectively, as saying that the agreement was necessary but that they were opposed to certain elements put forward by American negotiators. So even those who favor the treaty are on the defensive.

Two additional considerations relating to the current political environment should be borne in mind.

First, Sadr may be able to use this issue to end his political isolation among Iraqi factions. During the recent and ongoing government operations against the Sadrists and the Mahdi Army, all the Sunni factions Sadr had been trying to court supported the government against him, and the Shia factions that weren't supporting the campaign essentially stood aside. No one stood with him. Sadr is enough of a problem when working against the Shia clerical establishment; now he is working with the wind to his back.

Second, Maliki's political base is extremely narrow, and he is in no position to push an unpopular treaty through parliament, much less mount a national referendum. His government has been a minority in parliament since last September, and attempts at negotiating a new governing majority have repeatedly failed. I estimate that only about 100 members of the 275-seat parliament support him generally. This would be an uphill fight.

AFTER BASRA

The Political Factors Behind the Basra Operation; New Complications for Iran

While fighting continues between U.S.-Iraqi forces and the Mahdi Army in Baghdad and Basra, the aftermath of April's pitched battle between Iraq's central government and the Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army is turning out rather differently than most expected. While the initial reaction in the U.S. media was to paint Sadr as the victor after Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Maliki's initial drive fell short, this failed to take two things into consideration. One, Sadr's ceasefire order to his militia included demands on the Iraqi government, but the ceasefire was unilateral, and the government was not obligated to accede to even a single demand for the Mahdi Army to stand down. Two, "Operation Knight's Attack" - as Maliki dubbed the offensive - has reaped a strong benefit for the Iraqi prime minister, as Sadr finds himself almost entirely isolated with Kurdish and Sunni Arab factions supporting the weak Maliki government.

Background - Maliki's Political Weakness & and the Antecedents the Basra Offensive
In order to understand the aftermath of Basra as it affects the Iraqi political landscape, some background is necessary.

Maliki's government lost its majority last August after the largest Sunni party, the Accord Front (44 seats), withdrew from the government (although two ministers did not withdraw). He also lost the support of Iyad Allawi's Iraq List (23 seats at the time, 19 now due to defections). From September to December, Maliki's strategy was to regain a majority by getting the Sunnis to return to the government, but without accepting a redistrubution of power over the security services, one of the major reasons for the rupture. At the same time, the government - especially the Supreme Council-dominated provincial security services - were cracking down hard on the Mahdi Army. The main factor keeping Maliki in office was the fact that Accord was not willing to vote for "no confidence" because that would have meant new elections, and Accord would have faced an electoral wipeout running against the Sahwa "Awakening" tribal movements, which were then forming their own political fronts. So Maliki had a minority government, but he was institutionally strong because his United Iraqi Alliance held four of the five "power" ministries - Interior, Defense, Oil and the prime minister's office itself.

The ground seemed to be moving under the government's feet by late December, however. The Sunnis refused to reenter the government without a complete cabinet reshuffle - they did not demand Maliki's resignation, only saying that a change in prime minister should be "on the table" - and then Mahdi Karbala'i, the Ayatollah Sistani's representative in Karbala, issued a "no confidence"-like statement saying that most ministers were not qualified and should either start performing or resign. Maliki's Shia support in parliament had collapsed from 128 seats to probably about 60. There were almost daily news reports of negotiations to reshuffle the cabinet, but by March with no progress in sight, the Accord Front's leader, Abd al-Karim al-Samara'i, said Accord was willing to vote for new elections, which would mean Maliki's downfall as soon as parliament came back into session in late March. Maliki launched the Basra offensive within a matter of days after parliament had done so, and the Sunni factions put aside their differences and vowed to support Maliki in his attack on Sadr's Shia militia.

The Basra Operation, the Mahdi Army and the Iranian Role
The military aspects of "Knight's Attack" have been covered reasonably well in the English-language media. (For background, see for example The Iraqi Army Takes Last Basra Areas from Mahdi Army, New York Times; Sadr Warns of 'Open War' If Crackdown Continues Washington Post). Fighting has continued, especially in Sadr City in Baghdad, because that Shia sector is being used to mortar the Green Zone, while the government campaign against the Mahdi Army continues in the Shia provinces.

One point about the fighting itself needs to be clarified. The New York Times article linked above states of Sadr,

But it was difficult to tell whether his words posed a real threat or were a desperate effort to prove that his group was still a feared force, especially given that his militia’s actions in Basra followed a pattern seen again and again: the Mahdi militia battles Iraqi government troops to a standstill and then retreats. Why his fighters have clung to those fight-then-fade tactics is unknown.

I don't think this is hard to understand. The Mahdi Army has never been a death cult like al-Qaeda. Like Muqtada's illustrious forbearers, his uncle Muhammad Baqir Sadr and father Muhammad Sadiq Sadr, Sadrists have made clear they are willing to suffer death without ever seeking it. Sadrists believe that the Mahdi will return to Iraq soon and then form a world government which will abolish injustice. But the Mahdi needs people to fight for him - thus the name of Sadr's militia - and so they seek to stay alive if they can. Their strategy has always been to try to outlast the American presence and live to fight another day.

Evidence of Iranian support for Shia militias has been as prevelant as ever in recent weeks, but there has been a noted change in the willingness of Shia Iraqi security officials to speak openly about it. At a regional conference in Damascus on April 14, the Iraqi delegation openly blamed Iran for "shipping weapons across the border," while Iran criticized Iraq for not clamping down on the MEK, an armed anti-regime Iranian group (Iraqi Official Demands Investigating Commission in Regard to Iranian Role in Basra, al-Hayat). A spokesman for the Iraqi defense ministry has directly accused Iran of supporting militias, and local security officials have as well, as on April 29 when local police in Karbala found Iranian-made weapons in a cache there (see al-Quds al-Arabi, "Iraqi Police Discover Iranian Explosives West of Karbala"). What makes this increased outspokenness significant is that these security services are controlled by Shia Iraqis, with Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim's Supreme Council - founded in Iran - the dominant element. While reasons for skepticism remain, this is evidence that their conversion to Iraqi nationalism and Shi'ism - not the Iranian, Khomeinist brand - may be genuine.

Renewed Cabinet Negotiations, but the Same Refrain
The anti-Sadr operations have at least temporarily breathed new life into the Maliki government. Over the past three weeks there has been increasing talk of the Sunni Arabs rejoining the government, but the refrain from January and February has remained - Sunnis say they want to come back in the government, but the UIA refuses to share decision-making authority or deliver on promises, so nothing happens. Since mid-April the return of Accord has been reported as essentially imminent, but the discussions have involved simply giving Accord their five ministries back, not a redivision of power in the security services, which they have always demanded. I suspect that is why nothing is happening. Also, according to al-Hayat, Accord is now saying the government is failing to fulfill its pledge in implementing the new amnesty law - the passage of which was one of Accord's main demands. Furthermore, they can't just put Accord's members back in the cabinet, since they resigned, there must be a majority vote in parliament. Yet this is hindered by the fact that Accord has suffered nine defections since February - thus having only 35 seats - and Maliki does not appear to have appreciably increased his Shia support in parliament. So even if Accord agrees, I put the chance of confirmation at 50/50.

One clear lesson "After Basra" is how isolated Muqtada Sadr has become, and how his strategy in Iraq has failed so utterly. Some writers like to say that Sadr is underestimated and that he has learned from his early mistakes, but his lack of institutional power is due to errors of judgment he has made since that time, and his lack of allies is due to the Mahdi Army's death squads. He still has street power, especially in Baghdad and Basra, so he is a force to be reckoned with. But he doesn't have much else, and he is stuck in Iran - not a good place for an alleged Iraqi nationalist to be.

BACK FROM THE BRINK IN THE ANBAR

The Anbar Awakening and the Iraqi Islamic Party Step Back from the Brink; Maliki's 'Reconciliation' Show

This past week the Sunni "Awakening" (Sahwa) tribal alliance called the Anbar Salvation Council, a key ally of the U.S. military in the Anbar, and the Iraqi Islamic Party, Iraq's largest Sunni political faction, stepped back from what could still become a destabilizing conflict in Iraq's most important Sunni province. In mid-February, Ali Hatem, the head of the Dulaim tribe, and Hamid al-Hayis, head of the Salvation Council, gave the Iraqi Islamic Party, led by Iraqi Vice-President Tariq Hashemi, one month to vacate the province, or else.

This is a conflict that has been brewing hotter since last fall, when Sunni Iraqis failed in their attempts to form a united political list between the Anbar Awakening and the Accord Front, a three-faction Sunni party of which the Islamic Party is the primary component. Part of the problem is that the Islamic Party in particular dominates the political institutions of the Anbar, including the electoral commission which would oversee provincial elections planned for October, yet does not have the public support of the tribal Awakening. While the threat of political competition has kept the Accord Front - which withdrew from Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's government last September - from voting to dissolve parliament and bringing about new elections, the Awakening's fight is really with the Islamic Party. An article from the Washington Institute, Who Represents the Iraqi Sunnis?, provides more detail on the back story.

Yet the Awakening has decided to back down. As reported in the pan-Arabist daily al-Hayat, (American Pressure Succeeds in Persuading Tribal Leaders to Extend Threat to Islamic Party to Leave Anbar") Hayis and Hatem have agreed not to use force at the present time to force Hashemi's party from the province, but they are reserving the option. The Islamic Party had arranged for the province - which it dominates - to issue arrest warrants for the two leaders (for threatening violence), but no one expected them to be enforced (and they weren't). (Voices of Iraq News Agency reports that the deadline ended Saturday March 15, the first day of the week in the Arab world.) Al-Hayat further quotes Hatem as saying that they are acting in unison with the other prominent tribal leader in the Anbar, Anbar Awakening Council leader Ahmad Abu Risha, who will resign from the reconstruction committee in the Islamic Party-dominated provincial council.

(Note: the term "Awakening" (sahwa) is a general term for tribal movements in Iraq, mostly Sunni but also (more recently) Shia tribes, and it is also part of the name of the Awakening Council, which is a specific tribal political coalition in the Anbar. The Awakening Council and the Salvation Council are both Anbar tribal groups, and they have agreed to run against the Islamic Party on a joint election list.)

This intra-Sunni conflict, which is bad for Iraq, is the primary factor keeping Maliki in office, since he has not had a majority in parliament since September 2007. Last Tuesday's "Reconciliation Conference," which Maliki led, was a farce. Neither the Sunni parties nor Iyad Allawi's Iraqi List party even attended, and some of those who did attend just left early. As reported by al-Hayat (Accord Considers it 'a Formality' and Iraqi List Boycotts Describing it as a 'Propaganda Campaign for the Government'), the conference, which had been in planning for months, was considered a success only by members of Maliki's minority government. It also notes that some opposition parties claim that they didn't even receive formal invitations, although a government spokesman denied this. The Saudi daily al-Watan notes that the Arab League also did not bother to attend ("Maliki Considers Withdrawals of Ministers an Obstacle to Government Projects").

The Accord Front may throw Maliki a lifeline yet; at least for now they are indicating they are willing to resume negotiations on returning to the government if Maliki accedes to their demands for more say in decision-making (al-Hayat, Accord Confirms Willingness to Resume Negotiations with Government). Maybe their hearts were warmed by the sight of Maliki celebrating the Prophet's birthday in the Sunni Baghdad neighborhood of Athimiya, as reported in al-Quds al-Arabi on March 20 ("Maliki Promises to Include Athimiya Sahwa in Security Institutions"). I think it is more likely due to the sight of the Anbar Awakening.