LEBANON AND THE ARAB ALIGNMENT

Doha Agreement a Victory for Hizballah, Iran and Syria; Damascus Secures 'Veto' Over Hariri Investigation

As the dust settles from the recent violence in Lebanon - some of which is still being kicked up - the implications of the Doha agreement between Hizballah and the Lebanese majority have become clearer. Hizballah won this round, while Iran and Syria - especially the latter - where the primary beneficiaries among outside powers. The primary element of Hizballah's victory was political - they gained the "minority veto" that they had sought originally when leaving the Lebanese cabinet in 2006, allowing them to block the international investigation into the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, a priority above all for Damascus. This will have to be balanced against the harm Hizballah has done to its standing in the Arab world by using its "weapons of resistance" against other Arabs.

On the other hand, this has created a crisis of confidence among Lebanon's Sunnis and a sense of defeat among Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which supported the Siniora government. It also demonstrated the weakness of the United States in Lebanon.

The Doha Agreement and the Lebanese Domestic Scene
Last week's agreement in Doha, Qatar was preceded by a clear victory by Hizballah on the ground - the majority was forced to back down on its two decisions severing Hizballah's independent communications network and its control of Hariri International Airport (through a military officer loyal to them). The agreement resolving the conflict - for now - had three key elements:

• The election without delay of Imad Michel Sulayman as president of Lebanon by consensus.
• A three-fold division of the new cabinet with 30 members: 16 for the majority (Sunnis, Christians and Druze), 11 for the opposition (Hizballah plus the Christian faction of Imad Aoun), and three to be appointed by the president.
• The opposition, namely Hizballah, would be granted a "blocking third," or a veto over cabinet decisions. This is absolutely key because it means that Hizballah will be able to protect Syria from investigations into the assassinations of Lebanese public figures, most prominently Hariri.

Hizballah conceded nothing in these negotiations. Although there was a clause prohibiting the use of weapons by Lebanese factions against other Lebanese, this had been Hizballah's position previously anyway, and the issue of its weapons was otherwise kept off the agenda.

Sulayman was duly elected president by the Lebanese parliament on Sunday, May 25, with near unanimity. In his acceptance speech, he hit the key points of each faction - the importance of the Hariri investigation, the unacceptability of sectarian violence among Lebanese, the viability of the "resistance" against Israel. The phrase repeated over and over by Sulayman and others was ma ghalib wa ma maghlub - no victor and no vanquished, an ironic statement since Hizballah's emblem includes the phrase f'in hizballah hum al-ghalibun - "For Hizballah are the Victors."

Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah's speech the next day left no doubt, if there was room for any. Lasting approximately an hour and ten minutes, Nasrallah set forth a historical narrative intended to show that Hizballah's strategy of armed action against Israel and the United States was the only valid option open to Arabs and Muslims. Repeatedly affirming his loyalty to Iran and the doctrine of wilayat al-faqih (Khomeini's system of clerical rule), Nasrallah spoke from a position of strength, saying that Hizballah moderated its demands in Lebanon because it chose to, not because it needed to. In emphasizing that it retained its weapons to liberate Palestine and free Hizballah's prisoners in Israel, Nasrallah reminded his countrymen that he retained the right to drag Lebanon into another war with Israel that they did not want (the Hizballah attack on Israel setting off the 2006 had been to capture Israeli soldiers and use them to negotiate a prisoner swap). This did not go over well in Lebanon.

* Full text of Nasrallah speech, May 26, 2008

Regional Alignment: The Empowerment of the Tehran-Damascus Axis
The regional alignment in the Arab world has pitted U.S. allies Saudi Arabia, Egypt and most of the rest of the Arab League in support of Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora's government against Iran and Syria, whose non-state proxies include Hizballah (most importantly), Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the "rejectionist" secular Palestinian terror groups. These events have demonstrated that the latter have the upper hand in Lebanon.

One of the clearest statements of support from the Sunni side for Hizballah came from Jordan's Islamic Action Front, a sister organization to Hamas, where 63 of their prominent members signed a statement supporting the Shia group. This is not surprising, since the IAF has voiced support for Syria in the past - against its sister organization the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood - although it is notable given the current sectarian tensions (yet this support was not unanimous, see "Former Secretary General of Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood: Hizballah Loses Legitimacy of Role and Weapons," al-Quds al-Arabi, May 21, 2008; see also this article, which refers to their support more obliquely; I initially saw this reported on al-Arabiya but couldn't find a page on their site to source).

Abd al-Bari Atwan, the editor of al-Quds al-Arabi, spoke for many Sunnis who support anyone who opposes the United States in writing (see May 9 op-ed, "Round of Violence Enlarges in Lebanon"):

...There is a consensus among the alliance of the moderates [a sarcastic reference to U.S. allies] on the need to eliminate the resistance and its weapons in Lebanon, and meeting with it in this regard are America and Israel, so one cannot rule out that they might have suggested this action to incite Hizballah to action by their allies which they constitute the constitutional legitimacy in Lebanon...

Yes, Hizballah is supported by Iran, and so is Hamas, and if Iran has achieved dominance in Lebanon from the former, and a foothold in Palestine through the latter, this shows the weakness of Arabs at the official level and their complicity with the American project, and their lack of any real project to return to the Arabs the power they have lost, and the support of the Islamic nation. So there is an Iranian project, and a Turkish one, and third an Indian one, and fourth a Chinese one, but no Arab project at all...

Bear in mind that the dominate reaction among Sunni Arabs has been against Hizballah, but I believe that this points to an important division between those Sunnis who think ideologically and those whose views are based more on identity. For most, their natural sympathy is with the Sunnis of Lebanon. For activists and intellectuals who view the world through the lens of fighting America and Israel, Iran's role in the region is not a good thing to itself, but is worth supporting as a means of opposing the other side.

As for the "alliance of the moderates," Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Saud Faisal was exceptionally blunt. As quoted in al-Watan, he stated that "what happened in Lebanon was planned beforehand..." by Syria and Iran, who stand "behind the bloody coup and assassination attempt to which Lebanon and the entire region has been subjected" in an attempt to turn Lebanon into a "second Gaza." Saud Faisal was further quoted as saying of Iran that this could have "a negative impact on its relations with all Arab states..." ("Faisal: Iranian Support for Hizballah Coup will Negatively Affect its Relations with Arabs, May 14, 2008.) That is an understatement.

The importance of this statement is not its content - Saudi newspapers owned by members of the royal family say things like this often - but the fact that such a senior Saudi royal said so himself. Iran has shown its power in Lebanon, Syria has achieved the blocking veto it needs to stymie the Harriri investigation, but these events have also cost Hizballah the support it gained from the Sunni world in the wake of the 2006 war with Israel. Moreover, Syria has made a rapproachement with the Arab world all the more distant, and Iran has inflammed anti-Iranian sentiment in the Arab world. It is not a coincidence that in the wake of this Iranian victory, the UAE chose to reopen its fight with Iran over the three contested islands, comparing "Iranian occupation" to "Israeli occupation" of Palestine. It remains to be seen whether the short-term benefit outweighs the long-term consequences they face as a result.