AFTER BASRA

The Political Factors Behind the Basra Operation; New Complications for Iran

While fighting continues between U.S.-Iraqi forces and the Mahdi Army in Baghdad and Basra, the aftermath of April's pitched battle between Iraq's central government and the Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army is turning out rather differently than most expected. While the initial reaction in the U.S. media was to paint Sadr as the victor after Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Maliki's initial drive fell short, this failed to take two things into consideration. One, Sadr's ceasefire order to his militia included demands on the Iraqi government, but the ceasefire was unilateral, and the government was not obligated to accede to even a single demand for the Mahdi Army to stand down. Two, "Operation Knight's Attack" - as Maliki dubbed the offensive - has reaped a strong benefit for the Iraqi prime minister, as Sadr finds himself almost entirely isolated with Kurdish and Sunni Arab factions supporting the weak Maliki government.

Background - Maliki's Political Weakness & and the Antecedents the Basra Offensive
In order to understand the aftermath of Basra as it affects the Iraqi political landscape, some background is necessary.

Maliki's government lost its majority last August after the largest Sunni party, the Accord Front (44 seats), withdrew from the government (although two ministers did not withdraw). He also lost the support of Iyad Allawi's Iraq List (23 seats at the time, 19 now due to defections). From September to December, Maliki's strategy was to regain a majority by getting the Sunnis to return to the government, but without accepting a redistrubution of power over the security services, one of the major reasons for the rupture. At the same time, the government - especially the Supreme Council-dominated provincial security services - were cracking down hard on the Mahdi Army. The main factor keeping Maliki in office was the fact that Accord was not willing to vote for "no confidence" because that would have meant new elections, and Accord would have faced an electoral wipeout running against the Sahwa "Awakening" tribal movements, which were then forming their own political fronts. So Maliki had a minority government, but he was institutionally strong because his United Iraqi Alliance held four of the five "power" ministries - Interior, Defense, Oil and the prime minister's office itself.

The ground seemed to be moving under the government's feet by late December, however. The Sunnis refused to reenter the government without a complete cabinet reshuffle - they did not demand Maliki's resignation, only saying that a change in prime minister should be "on the table" - and then Mahdi Karbala'i, the Ayatollah Sistani's representative in Karbala, issued a "no confidence"-like statement saying that most ministers were not qualified and should either start performing or resign. Maliki's Shia support in parliament had collapsed from 128 seats to probably about 60. There were almost daily news reports of negotiations to reshuffle the cabinet, but by March with no progress in sight, the Accord Front's leader, Abd al-Karim al-Samara'i, said Accord was willing to vote for new elections, which would mean Maliki's downfall as soon as parliament came back into session in late March. Maliki launched the Basra offensive within a matter of days after parliament had done so, and the Sunni factions put aside their differences and vowed to support Maliki in his attack on Sadr's Shia militia.

The Basra Operation, the Mahdi Army and the Iranian Role
The military aspects of "Knight's Attack" have been covered reasonably well in the English-language media. (For background, see for example The Iraqi Army Takes Last Basra Areas from Mahdi Army, New York Times; Sadr Warns of 'Open War' If Crackdown Continues Washington Post). Fighting has continued, especially in Sadr City in Baghdad, because that Shia sector is being used to mortar the Green Zone, while the government campaign against the Mahdi Army continues in the Shia provinces.

One point about the fighting itself needs to be clarified. The New York Times article linked above states of Sadr,

But it was difficult to tell whether his words posed a real threat or were a desperate effort to prove that his group was still a feared force, especially given that his militia’s actions in Basra followed a pattern seen again and again: the Mahdi militia battles Iraqi government troops to a standstill and then retreats. Why his fighters have clung to those fight-then-fade tactics is unknown.

I don't think this is hard to understand. The Mahdi Army has never been a death cult like al-Qaeda. Like Muqtada's illustrious forbearers, his uncle Muhammad Baqir Sadr and father Muhammad Sadiq Sadr, Sadrists have made clear they are willing to suffer death without ever seeking it. Sadrists believe that the Mahdi will return to Iraq soon and then form a world government which will abolish injustice. But the Mahdi needs people to fight for him - thus the name of Sadr's militia - and so they seek to stay alive if they can. Their strategy has always been to try to outlast the American presence and live to fight another day.

Evidence of Iranian support for Shia militias has been as prevelant as ever in recent weeks, but there has been a noted change in the willingness of Shia Iraqi security officials to speak openly about it. At a regional conference in Damascus on April 14, the Iraqi delegation openly blamed Iran for "shipping weapons across the border," while Iran criticized Iraq for not clamping down on the MEK, an armed anti-regime Iranian group (Iraqi Official Demands Investigating Commission in Regard to Iranian Role in Basra, al-Hayat). A spokesman for the Iraqi defense ministry has directly accused Iran of supporting militias, and local security officials have as well, as on April 29 when local police in Karbala found Iranian-made weapons in a cache there (see al-Quds al-Arabi, "Iraqi Police Discover Iranian Explosives West of Karbala"). What makes this increased outspokenness significant is that these security services are controlled by Shia Iraqis, with Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim's Supreme Council - founded in Iran - the dominant element. While reasons for skepticism remain, this is evidence that their conversion to Iraqi nationalism and Shi'ism - not the Iranian, Khomeinist brand - may be genuine.

Renewed Cabinet Negotiations, but the Same Refrain
The anti-Sadr operations have at least temporarily breathed new life into the Maliki government. Over the past three weeks there has been increasing talk of the Sunni Arabs rejoining the government, but the refrain from January and February has remained - Sunnis say they want to come back in the government, but the UIA refuses to share decision-making authority or deliver on promises, so nothing happens. Since mid-April the return of Accord has been reported as essentially imminent, but the discussions have involved simply giving Accord their five ministries back, not a redivision of power in the security services, which they have always demanded. I suspect that is why nothing is happening. Also, according to al-Hayat, Accord is now saying the government is failing to fulfill its pledge in implementing the new amnesty law - the passage of which was one of Accord's main demands. Furthermore, they can't just put Accord's members back in the cabinet, since they resigned, there must be a majority vote in parliament. Yet this is hindered by the fact that Accord has suffered nine defections since February - thus having only 35 seats - and Maliki does not appear to have appreciably increased his Shia support in parliament. So even if Accord agrees, I put the chance of confirmation at 50/50.

One clear lesson "After Basra" is how isolated Muqtada Sadr has become, and how his strategy in Iraq has failed so utterly. Some writers like to say that Sadr is underestimated and that he has learned from his early mistakes, but his lack of institutional power is due to errors of judgment he has made since that time, and his lack of allies is due to the Mahdi Army's death squads. He still has street power, especially in Baghdad and Basra, so he is a force to be reckoned with. But he doesn't have much else, and he is stuck in Iran - not a good place for an alleged Iraqi nationalist to be.